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Abstract
As the international financial crisis spreads, some governments are using “unconventional tools” 
of monetary and financial policy to protect themselves. Should policies to control international 
capital flows be part of the government “toolkit” in these difficult times? This essay answers: YES. It 
describes the economic arguments for and against using capital controls, prudential regulations and 
other “capital management techniques” to manage international financial flows, presents empirical 
evidence on their impacts, and describes the variety of policies that many countries have successfully 
applied to enhance macroeconomic and financial stability, create policy space, and achieve other 
national development goals.
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Should Financial Flows Be Regulated? Yes
Gerald Epstein1
Introduction
Prior to the First World War—in the late 19th and early 20th centuries—the industrialized economies of 
Europe and the United States were characterized by a high degree of global financial integration, a relatively 
large role for markets, and a philosophy based on limited government regulation (laissez-faire). Capital could 
flow freely with very light regulation both within and between countries, and there were relatively low barri-
ers to trade in goods and services. Many countries’ monetary systems were based on a gold standard, which 
fixed countries’ exchange rates relative to one another. The Bank of England “orchestrated” the system with 
help from central banks in France and elsewhere on the European continent. This system helped bring great 
wealth to bankers and industrial capitalists in the richer countries, and spread investments in infrastructure 
and other projects to the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the New World, enriching some elites in 
those countries as well.
However, in the 1930s, this system of free capital mobility collapsed, as did most of the world 
economy. Figure 1, due to Reinhart and Rogoff, shows the rise of capital flows in the late 19th and early 20th 
1  The author thanks his co-authors and colleagues James Crotty, Ilene Grabel, Arjun Jayadev, and Jomo K. S. for their 
contributions to his understanding of capital management techniques and for their work, on which he draws liberally 
here. Of course, they are not responsible for any errors. A version of this paper will be published in Macroeconomic 
Debates: Competing Views, edited by Mario Seccareccia and Hassan Bougrine. Ottawa: Emond Montgomery 
Publications Ltd, 2009.
Figure 1
Capital Mobility and the Incidence of Banking Crisis: All Countries, 1800–2008
Source: Reinhart and Rogo￿ (2008, p. 23).
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century, and then their dramatic collapse in the 1930s. Among the key causes of the collapse were the excesses 
allowed by the laissez-faire approach to financial markets, which led to excessive accumulations of debt and 
highly speculative investments—a significant number of which failed spectacularly. Equally important was the 
role of international capital flows in worsening the crisis as it broke out, with capital fleeing those countries 
perceived to be in trouble and flooding into those seen as safe havens (Block 1974; Kindleberger 1986 Eichen-
green 1992). Figure 1 also shows that international capital flows tend to precede banking crises.
In the aftermath of the collapse and the ensuing, catastrophic Second World War, governments in 
most of the world—with the reluctant blessing of the newly created International Monetary Fund (IMF)—
adopted government controls (exchange and capital controls) to manage the international flows of money 
and capital. This policy had been strongly advocated by John Maynard Keynes, the most important econo-
mist of the 20th century and co-architect of the Bretton Woods agreements that, in 1944, had established 
the IMF and the World Bank as well as a global system of fixed exchange rates (Crotty 1983). For at least the 
first three decades following the Second World War, controls over the international flow of capital became 
the norm in most of the world.
Over time, as the world economy recovered and much of the developed world flourished in the 
so-called “golden age” of economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, memories of the financial crises of the 
Great Depression faded, and governments began to relax restrictions on the international flow of capital and 
money (Helleiner 1984). From 1971 to 1973, the post-war Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates 
broke down and exchange rates became more flexible. A general shift in economic fashion occurred, from 
an approach (prevalent from the 1940s to the 1960s) based on financial regulation of the market aimed at 
maintaining stability and achieving social goals to a return to a more laissez-faire approach in which the 
market dominates. This movement back toward laissez-faire accelerated with the oil crises and stagflation of 
the 1970s and the coming to power of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in 
the United States—both very strong advocates of smaller government, less regulation, and more promotion 
of market dominance and the interests of business as the best approach for economic development (Diaz-
Alejandro, 1985; Glyn, 1986). Naturally, these policies were strongly supported by banking and business 
interests, as well as by some workers and members of the middle class who had suffered during the stagfla-
tionary period of the 1970s.
The next 20 years witnessed a secular move toward more financial deregulation and the reduction of 
controls over financial flows in the United States, Canada, and Europe, as well as in many developing coun-
tries. Figure 2 shows the reductions in capital regulations and the corresponding increases in capital mobil-
ity, which rose in most types of countries in the 1980s. Note that figure 2 is based on capital flow (account) 
regulations (de jure capital controls), whereas figure 1 is based on actual flows of capital (de facto capital flows). 
At the same time, the frequency and severity of banking and financial crises accelerated as well, most, but not 
all of them, primarily afflicting developing countries (figure 1). Still, the majority of economists and the IMF 
continued to press for financial liberalization and the elimination of capital controls in the developing world.
Then, in 1997, the so-called Asian financial crisis hit, creating havoc in many highly successful Asian 
countries including Thailand, South Korea, and Malaysia. This crisis was soon followed by the Russian finan-
cial crisis. Figure 1 reflects these crises and illustrates a general rule. Prior to crises, international financial flows 
accelerate. Then, when the crisis hits, international capital flows tend to drop precipitously (so-called “sudden 
stops”), the inflows exacerbating the build-up to the crisis and then the outflows worsening its severity.Should Financial Flows Be Regulated? Yes  3
With the Russian and Asian crises, continued pressure for financial liberalization by bankers and 
economists collided head-on with the reality of unstable financial flows, which were clearly contributing 
to—and even causing—financial crises with alarming frequency. This clash was perhaps most apparent in 
the debate over a proposed amendment to the IMF bylaws that would have made capital account liberaliza-
tion a requirement of membership; the proposal was made just as the Asian financial crisis was hitting. Dani 
Rodrik (1998) has been critical of full capital account liberalization, and has offered the following analogy:
“Imagine landing on a planet that runs on widgets.2 You are told that international trade in widgets 
is highly unpredictable and volatile on this planet, for reasons that are poorly understood. A small number of 
nations have access to imported widgets, while many others are completely shut out even when they impose 
no apparent obstacles to trade. With some regularity, those countries that have access to widgets get too much 
of a good thing, and their markets are flooded with imported widgets. This allows them to go on a widget 
binge, which makes everyone pretty happy for a while. However, such binges are often interrupted by a sudden 
cut-off in supply, unrelated to any change in circumstances. The turnaround causes the affected economies to 
experience painful economic adjustments. For reasons equally poorly understood, when one country is hit by a 
supply cutback in this fashion, many other countries experience similar shocks in quick succession. Some years 
thereafter, a widget boom starts anew. Your hosts beg you for guidance: how should they deal with their widget 
problem? Ponder this question for a while and then ponder under what circumstances your central recommen-
dation would be that all extant controls on international trade in widgets be eliminated. Substitute “interna-
tional capital flows” for “widgets” above and the description fits today’s world economy quite well.”
Indeed, during the Asian financial crises, countries that had strong controls over international finan-
cial flows (for example, China and India) were much less negatively affected by the financial crisis than were 
2  At the time this article was written, “widgets” simply meant “things”; this was before the current use of the term for 
cool programs connected to your desktop, blog, or cellphone.
Figure 2
Capital Account Liberalization, 1973–1995
Source: Lee and Jayadev (2005: 26).
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countries that had few controls (see the discussion below). This observation led some economists in aca-
demia, the IMF, and other policy circles to question the conventional wisdom that free flows of international 
capital will lead to the best outcomes.
More than a decade after it was written, Rodrik’s analogy it is still highly relevant—perhaps even 
more so than in 1998. The financial crisis, which spread in 2008 from the “sub-prime” housing markets of 
the United States to many other financial markets via international capital (and trade) flows, has placed in 
focus once again the instability and difficulties that can be created across national borders by the unregu-
lated flow of finance. Once again, then, the question is raised: Should financial flows be regulated? This essay 
answers the question with a “yes.”
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. The next section includes a brief discussion of the 
arguments for unregulated (“free”) capital mobility and a comparison of these with the empirical evidence. 
The following section discusses the goals of regulating international capital flows and the types of controls 
that governments can use to manage these flows. The next section presents evidence regarding the costs, ben-
efits, and effectiveness of different types of controls. The final section presents my conclusions.
Arguments for Unrestricted International Capital Flows
Economists’ arguments in favour of minimal government restrictions on the international flows of money 
and capital stem from their basic faith in the efficiency of the market and the inefficiency and/or inefficacy 
of government regulation. While this faith is quite general, it is usually applied more specifically in specific 
contexts. In the case of financial markets, the arguments are rooted in the following perceived “functions” of 
money, finance, and financial markets: 1) to provide a medium of exchange, means of payment, and unit of 
account; 2) to allocate credit to its most productive uses; 3) to serve as an efficient intermediary between sav-
ers and investors; 4) to allow savers to reduce the risks associated with making investments; and 5) to provide 
an efficient means to save for the future (what economists refer to as “smoothing the consumption stream 
over time”). In effect, these economists argue that financial markets “free from government regulation” can 
achieve these aims better than regulated markets can (Neely 1999).
Economists make a leap when they apply these arguments for the efficiency of the free flows of capi-
tal, taken from an analysis of a national economy, and apply them to international flows of finance between 
countries, despite the fact that there are big differences between purely domestic financial transactions and 
international ones. Moreover, these arguments are based on a microeconomic logic and do not take into ac-
count many key macroeconomic concerns, such as the impact on unemployment, and financial instability.
In any event, the upshot of these claims is that free capital mobility should be associated with the 
following, all relative to contexts in which there are more regulations and controls over capital flows: 
higher levels of output and investment;  • 
more rapid productivity growth and economic growth overall;  • 
an allocation of financial resources away from those who need them less (rich countries) to those  • 
who need them more (poor countries); 
less risk; and  • 
an improved ability to smooth consumption over time. • Should Financial Flows Be Regulated? Yes  5
What does the evidence show? There is now a large body of empirical literature that investigates 
these claims over time and across countries (see Lee and Jayadev 2005; Reinhart and Rogoff 2008; Rodrik 
and Subramanian 2008; and Kose et al. 2006).3 A number of studies have attempted to examine the link 
between free capital mobility and growth. Overall, this literature shows a lack of any compelling evidence 
for a positive link between capital account liberalization and growth. Perhaps the most careful and detailed 
summary of this literature is provided by Kose and others, who conclude that, “taken as a whole, the vast 
empirical literature provides little robust evidence of a causal relationship between financial integration and 
growth” (2006, 8).
As figure 1 shows, there is a strong correlation between capital mobility and financial crisis. More-
over, there is strong evidence that financial crises result in permanent losses of output (Cerra and Saxena 
2007).
In short, capital account liberalization and integration do not appear to increase economic growth 
or investment; instead, they contribute to financial crises that can have devastating short-term effects as 
well as costly long-term effects on output. Furthermore, capital account liberalization and crisis can increase 
inequality (Lee and Jayadev 2005). There is very little to no evidence that free capital mobility delivers the 
benefits suggested by advocates. Still, it is possible that controlling flows with government regulation could 
make the situation even worse, or, at best, is unnecessary. Moreover, there are many different ways to manage 
flows and many different types of flows to manage.
In light of these findings, it is not surprising that many countries use capital controls to manage the 
flows of finance across borders. What are the main goals of these policies? What types of policies work best, 
and under what circumstances?
Goals and Mechanisms for Controlling International Financial Flows4
Types of Controls
First, it is important to be aware of the techniques that are available for controlling and managing the 
quantity, type, and impact of international financial flows. Table 1 presents a list and typology of controls. 
Controls, first of all, are simply types of government regulations or taxes that affect inflows or outflows of 
capital or the effects of the latter on the domestic economy. Types of capital flows that are affected are most 
easily thought of as the buying by domestic residents of foreign assets (outflows) or the selling of assets by 
domestic residents to foreigners (inflows). These assets are usually financial assets—stocks, bonds and securi-
ties of various types, currency, and bank deposits—but they can also refer to real assets, such as land. These 
securities and assets can be short term and highly liquid, such as bank deposits and short-term government 
bonds, or they can be longer term and less liquid, such as significant ownership of businesses (foreign direct 
investment), long-term government bonds, or real estate. Currency itself (dollars, euros, pesos, and so on) is 
the most short term and liquid. Increasingly, complex financial assets and liabilities (debts) called derivatives 
are involved in the flows of capital in and out of countries; these are hard to control, mostly because they 
are almost completely unregulated and relatively little is known about the roles of these securities in many 
financial transactions (Dodd 2002; Garber 1998).
3  Thanks to Arjun Jayadev for sharing some of his unpublished work in this area, which I have drawn on here.
4  This section draws heavily on my joint work with Ilene Grabel and Jomo K. S. (2004) and on the separate work of 
Grabel (2003, 2004).6  D E S A  Wo r k i n g   P a p e r   N o .   7 7
Typologies for understanding controls usually distinguish between controls on outflows (domestic 
buying of foreign assets, including foreign currency) and those on inflows (the buying by foreign residents of 
domestic assets, including domestic currency). Another key distinction is between controls that work mainly 
through price measures, such as taxing inflows or outflows, and those that work primarily through quantita-
tive measures, such as placing a quota on buying or selling assets, restricting the types of assets that can be 
bought or sold, or placing an absolute ban on the buying or selling of particular assets. This distinction is 
similar to the distinction in international trade, where economists distinguish between restrictive measures 
that rely on tariffs (price-based measures) and those that rely on quotas (quantity-based measures). (See 
Neely 1999).5
Finally, regulations that affect the inflows or outflows of capital directly can be distinguished from 
those that affect them and their impacts indirectly, by implementing prudential regulations on financial insti-
tutions. . These prudential regulations can be capital regulations, regulations concerning maturity mismatch-
es between short- and long-term assets and liabilities, regulations concerning derivative contracts, regulations 
5  Another distinction concerns measures that affect only the flows of capital (the so-called “capital account”) and those 
that affect trade and inflows and outflows of returns from holding investments (the so-called “current account”). Since 
we will not discuss this distinction further, it is not reflected in table 1.
Table 1. Objectives and Types of Capital Management Techniques
Objectives Price-based Quantity-based Prudential
Inflows
• Keep a stable and 
competitive real exchange 
rate•Limit excessive debt 
and maturity or locational 
mismatch to prevent 
financial instability
• Alter the composition of 
inflows to attract desired 
inflows
• Limit foreign ownership 
of assets for sovereign 
purposes or to protect 
domestic industries
• Tobin tax (tax on foreign 
exchange transactions)
• Reserve requirements 
on inflows of capital (e.g., 
URR, unrequited reserve 
requirements)
• Taxation of capital 
inflows
• Quantitative limits on 
foreign ownership of 
domestic companies’ 
assets
• Reporting requirements 
and quantitative limits on 
borrowing from abroad
• Limits on ability to 
borrow from offshore 
entities
• Keynes tax (tax on 
domestic financial 
transactions)
• Reporting requirements 
and limitations on maturity 
structure of liabilities and 
assets
• Reserve requirements 
on deposits
• Capital requirements 
on assets and restrictions 
on off-balance-sheet 
activities and derivatives 
contracts
Outflows
• Protect tax base by 
reducing capital flight
• Maintain stability of 
exchange rate
• Preserve savings to 
finance investment
• Help in credit allocation 
mechanisms in order to 
support “industrial policy” 
and investments for social 
objectives
• Enhance the autonomy 
of monetary policy in 
order to reduce inflation 
or expand employment 
and economic growth
• Tobin tax
• Multiple exchange rates
• Exchange controls
• Restrictions on 
purchase of foreign 
assets including foreign 
deposits
• Limits on currency 
convertibility
• Limits on asset 
acquisition




• All of the above • “Trip wire and speed bump” approach (Grabel, 2004): identify a set of early 
warning signals and implement these various qualitative and quantitative policies 
gradually and dynamically, with an emphasis on controls on inflows.
Source: Epstein (2009).Should Financial Flows Be Regulated? Yes  7
concerning the borrowing of domestic currency from offshore banks, and so on. While such regulations 
might not affect the flows of foreign assets and liabilities directly, they will often affect them indirectly. In 
many countries, derivative contracts are often entered into with foreign counterparties maturity mismatches 
often involve foreign flows; dealing with offshore banks often involve buying and selling foreign assets and 
liabilities, and so on.
The term “capital management techniques” is used to refer to the combination of capital and ex-
change controls plus the financial prudential regulations that indirectly affect these flows and their impacts. 
In the discussion that follows, we will move interchangeably between the terms “capital controls” and “capi-
tal management techniques” for ease of exposition.
Examples of controls that involve taxes are direct taxes on the buying or selling of foreign exchange. 
An example of this is the so-called “Tobin tax,” named after Nobel prize-winning economist James Tobin, 
who proposed such a tax in the 1970s (see Tobin 1978). The Tobin tax would place a small tax on all foreign 
exchange transactions, thereby discouraging the buying and selling of foreign exchange for very short-term 
purposes, which some economists argue tends to be for speculative purposes. The tax could raise significant 
amounts of revenue if implemented on an international scale. If that were to happen, some economists and 
policy-makers have urged that any revenues generated be used for a variety of purposes, including aid for 
economic development (Chang and Grabel 2004). A “Keynes” tax would implement a small tax on all do-
mestic transactions and would serve similar purposes to the Tobin tax but on a domestic scale (Pollin 2005).
Another example of a tax-based control is the so-called “unremunerated reserve requirement” 
(URR), or encaje, used in Chile and Colombia. In Chile, this policy required foreign investors who wanted 
to invest in the country to place some of the funds in a bank account for a period of time; they received no 
interest on the funds. This policy works like a tax, since the investors lose out on the interest they could have 
received if they were able to invest in interest-bearing securities or bank accounts.
Quantitative regulations include quotas on buying foreign exchange, limits on buying equity in cer-
tain industries, limits on ownership shares of firms, and an inability to borrow money from offshore banks 
unless the funds are used for particular purposes.
Another important distinction is whether countries utilize controls in a rigid or flexible way. Im-
portantly, countries often use controls in a dynamic fashion, tightening or loosening them as circumstances 
demand rather than keeping them in place in a fixed—and therefore static—way. For example, when a crisis 
hits, countries may tighten controls; when the crisis eases, they may loosen them again.
Objectives of Capital Management Techniques
There are many ways to categorize the goals of capital management techniques (see table 1 for a detailed list 
of goals). More generally, capital management techniques are used to achieve the following four objectives: to 
promote financial stability; to encourage desirable investment and financing arrangements; to enhance policy 
autonomy, including the maintenance of stable and competitive exchange rates; and to enhance national 
sovereignty and democracy. The more specific goals in table 1 can be seen as particular means of achieving 
these objectives.
In order to understand the goals, challenges, and trade-offs associated with capital management 
techniques, we first need to understand the so-called “trilemma” problem of international finance.8  D E S A  Wo r k i n g   P a p e r   N o .   7 7
The “Trilemma”
Capital mobility creates challenges for countries that want to set interest rates for domestic purposes. For 
example, central banks may want to lower interest rates to reduce the cost of borrowing in order to increase 
investment, employment, and economic growth. At other times, governments and central banks may want 
to raise interest rates to slow down an “overheated” economy and reduce inflation. International capital 
mobility can undermine these policies because, in integrated, global financial markets, domestic interest rates 
are strongly affected by foreign interest rates. Domestic and foreign investors will move capital from coun-
tries that have lower interest rates—adjusted for political and exchange rate risks—to countries that have 
higher interest rates. So if a central bank lowers its interest rate to try to encourage domestic investment, 
capital might leave the country in search of higher interest rates abroad, counteracting the policy. Similarly, 
if central banks try to raise interest rates to fight inflation, then investors might send capital flowing into the 
country, thereby driving down interest rates and undermining the policy.
Capital mobility also causes problems for countries wishing to fix or smooth their exchange rates. 
If investors think that risk has increased in a country, then they might sell their investments and take their 
money out of the country. When they do this, they sell their domestic currency assets and buy foreign ex-
change, thereby lowering the value (depreciating or putting pressure for a devaluation) of the domestic cur-
rency. If the country does not want its currency value to go down, then it will have to raise its interest rates 
to try to keep domestic assets more attractive and prevent the capital from leaving. But what if the country 
does not want to raise interest rates, because, say, it is facing a recession and wants lower interest rates to 
promote domestic investment?
Here, we see the “trilemma.” Countries have a very difficult time maintaining all three of these 
goals—free capital mobility, autonomous monetary policy directed to domestic concerns, and fixed (or 
highly managed) exchange rates—at once. In general, they can have at most two out of the three. For ex-
ample, they can choose free capital mobility and autonomous monetary policy, but then they must let the 
market determine the exchange rate. Or they can have free capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate, but 
then they must give up the autonomous monetary policy and use it to keep the exchange rate fixed in the 
face of market-determined capital flows.
This problem can also be explained by the so-called “interest parity relation,” which says that in a fi-
nancially integrated international economy, domestic interest rates are tied to foreign interest rates (adjusted 
for expected changes in exchange rates and risks associated with default or political instability).
If a country wants to have domestically oriented monetary policy and a fixed or highly managed 
exchange rate, then it must control capital mobility. That is where capital controls or capital management 
techniques come in.
Objectives of Capital Management Techniques
Capital management techniques can promote financial stability
Capital management techniques can promote financial stability through their ability to reduce currency, 
flight, fragility, and/or contagion risks. Capital management can thereby reduce the potential for financial 
crisis and attendant economic and social devastation (Grabel 2003; Epstein, Grabel and Jomo 2003).Should Financial Flows Be Regulated? Yes  9
“Currency risk” refers to the risk that a currency will appreciate or depreciate significantly over a 
short period of time. “Investor flight risk” refers to the likelihood that holders of liquid financial assets will 
sell their holdings en masse in the face of perceived difficulty. “Lender flight risk” refers to the likelihood 
that lenders will terminate lending programs or will only extend loans on prohibitive terms. “Fragility risk” 
refers to the vulnerability of an economy’s private and public borrowers to internal or external shocks that 
would jeopardize their ability to meet current obligations. Fragility risk arises in a number of ways: borrow-
ers might employ financing strategies that involve maturity or locational mismatch; agents might finance 
private investment with capital that is prone to flight risk; or investors (domestic and foreign) might 
over-invest in certain sectors, thereby creating overcapacity and fuelling unsustainable speculative bubbles. 
Finally, “contagion risk” refers to the threat that a country will fall victim to financial and macroeconomic 
instability that originates elsewhere. Capital management techniques can reduce contagion risk by manag-
ing the degree of financial integration and by reducing the vulnerability of individual countries to currency, 
flight, and fragility risks.
Capital management techniques can promote desirable types of investment and financing arrangements 
and discourage less desirable types of investment/financing strategies
Capital management techniques can influence the composition of the economy’s aggregate investment port-
folio and the financing arrangements that underpin these investments. Capital management techniques—
particularly those that involve inflow controls—can promote desirable types of investment and financing 
strategies by rewarding investors and borrowers who engage in them. Desirable types of investment are those 
that create employment; improve living standards; and promote greater income equality, technology transfer, 
learning by doing, and/or long-term growth. Desirable types of financing are those that are long term, stable, 
and sustainable. Capital management can discourage less desirable types of investment and financing strate-
gies by increasing their cost or precluding them altogether (Nembhard 1996).
Capital management techniques can enhance the autonomy of economic and social policy
Capital management techniques can enhance policy autonomy in a number of ways. They can reduce the 
severity of currency risk, thereby allowing authorities to protect a currency peg. They can also keep exchange 
rates at competitive and stable levels. Capital management can create space for the government and/or the 
central bank to pursue growth-promoting and/or reflationary macroeconomic policies by neutralizing the 
threat of capital flight (via restrictions on capital inflows or outflows). Moreover, by reducing the risk of 
financial crisis in the first place, capital management can reduce the likelihood that governments will be 
compelled to use contractionary macro- and microeconomic policies, as well as social policy, as a signal to 
attract foreign investment back to the country or as a precondition for financial assistance from the IMF. 
Finally, capital management techniques can reduce the spectre of excessive foreign control or ownership of 
domestic resources.
Capital management techniques can enhance national autonomy and even democracy
It follows from the third point that capital management can enhance democracy by reducing the potential 
for speculators and external actors to exercise undue influence over domestic decision-making either directly 
or indirectly (via the threat of capital flight). Capital management techniques can reduce the veto power of 
the financial community and the IMF and create space for the interests of other groups (such as advocates 
for the poor) to play a role in the design of economic and social policy. Capital management techniques can 
thus be said to enhance democracy because they create the opportunity for pluralism in policy design.10  DESA Working Paper No. 77
Costs of Capital Management Techniques
Critics of capital management techniques argue that they impose four types of costs: they reduce growth; 
reduce efficiency and policy discipline; promote corruption and waste; and aggravate credit scarcity, and 
uncertainty. Critics argue that the benefits that derive from capital management (such as financial stability) 
come at an unacceptably high price.
In sum, many critics argue that there are significant costs associated with capital management tech-
niques. However, there is little consensus in the empirical literature on the size—or even the existence—of 
these costs. More importantly, researchers have largely failed to investigate the relative weight of costs and 
benefits.
Evidence on the Costs, Benefits, and Effectiveness of Capital Management Techniques
There have been many studies of the impact, effectiveness, and costs and benefits of capital controls and capi-
tal management techniques (for recent surveys, see Epstein, Grabel and Jomo 2003, and Magud, Reinhart, 
and Rogoff 2005). Some of these offer a statistical/econometric analysis, while others rely on case studies.
Case Study Evidence6
I first present case study evidence compiled by Epstein, Grabel, and Jomo (2003) (See tables 2 and 3). The 
researchers undertook case studies of capital management techniques in seven countries: Chile, Colombia, 
China, Taiwan, India, Malaysia, and Singapore. As table 2 shows, these countries used quite specific combi-
nations of the types of controls listed in table 1, and for a variety of purposes (mostly those listed in table 1).
First, consider six commonly held—and mistaken—ideas about capital management techniques. 
One is that these techniques can only work in the short run, not the long run. However, with the exception 
of Malaysia, all of the cases show that management can achieve important objectives over a significant period 
of time. Taking China and Singapore as two cases at different ends of the spectrum in terms of types of 
controls, both countries effectively employed capital management techniques for more than a decade in the 
service of important policy objectives.
A second common view is that, for capital management to work over a long period of time, 
measures have to be consistently strengthened. In fact, the reality is much more complex than this. In 
Malaysia, Chile, and China, during times of stress it proved necessary to strengthen controls to address 
leakages that were being exploited by the private sector. However, as these same cases demonstrate, controls 
can be loosened when a crisis subsides or when the international environment changes, and then reinstated 
or strengthened as necessary. In short, dynamic capital management techniques have been successfully 
utilized across a range of countries.
A third common (but misleading) view is that, for capital management to work, there must be 
an experienced bureaucracy in place. It is certainly true that having experience helps; China, India, and 
Singapore are all examples of countries that have long-term experience with government direction of 
the economy. Malaysia, however, is an important counter-example. The country was able to successfully 
implement capital management even without having had a great deal of experience in doing so. In the case 
6  This section draws heavily on Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2003).Should Financial Flows Be Regulated? Yes  1 1
Table 2. Summary: Types and Objectives of Capital Management  
Techniques Employed During the 1990s
Types of capital management techniques Objectives of capital management techniques
Chile
Inflows:
• FDI and PI: One year residence requirement
• 30% URR-tax on foreign loans: 1.2% per year
Outflows:
• no significant restrictions
Domestic financial regulations:
• strong regulatory measures
• Lengthen maturity structures and stabilize 
inflows
• Help manage exchange rates to maintain export 
competitiveness
• Protect economy from financial instability




• Bank accounts can only be used for domestic 
spending, not financial speculation
• Foreign participation in stock market regulated
• FDI tightly regulated
Residents




• Restrictions on lending for real estate and other 
speculative purposes
• Promote industrialization
• Help manage exchange rates to maintain export 
competitiveness
• Maintain financial stability and insulate itself 
from foreign financial crises
Singapore
Inflows:




• financial institutions can’t extend S$ credit 
to non-residents if they are likely to use for 
speculation
• if they borrow for use abroad, must swap first 
into foreign currency
Domestic financial regulations:
restrictions on creation of swaps, and other 
derivatives that could be used for speculation 
against S$
• prevent speculation against S$-support “soft 
peg” of S$
• help maintain export competitiveness




• Restrictions on foreign borrowing
Outflows:
Non-residents
• 12-month repatriation waiting period






• Restrict access to Malaysian currency
Residents
• Encourage to borrow domestic borrowing and 
investment
• Maintain political and economic sovereignty
• Kill the offshore ringgit market
• Shut down offshore share market
• Help reflate the economy
• Help create financial stability and insulate the 
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of Chile, to take another example, the central bank had no previous experience implementing the reserve 
requirement scheme, though it had had some negative experiences trying to implement capital controls 
in the 1970s. What is more important than experience is state capacity and administrative capacity more 
generally.
A fourth view, which has recently become popular, is that controls on capital inflows work but those 
on outflows do not. However, in our sample we have seen examples of policy success in both dimensions. 
For example, Chile and Colombia maintained controls on inflows, while China, India, and Malaysia main-
tained controls on outflows. In addition, Singapore and Taiwan maintain controls on the ability of residents 
and non-residents to use domestic currency offshore for purposes of “speculating” against the home currency. 
This is a control on outflows that has successfully insulated these countries from crises and helped their gov-
ernments manage their exchange rates.
We now turn to the lessons to be drawn from the case studies, which are summarized in tables 2 and 
3. First and most generally, capital management techniques can contribute to currency and financial stability, 
macro- and microeconomic policy autonomy, stable long-term investment, and sound current account 
performance. There may also be some costs associated with capital management techniques, such as the fact 
that they can create space for public corruption.
Second, successful implementation of controls over a significant period of time depends on the 
presence of a sound policy environment and strong fundamentals. These include a relatively low debt ratio, 
moderate rates of inflation, sustainable current account and fiscal balances, consistent exchange rate policies, 
Table 2 (cont’d)











• Strict limitations on development of domestic 
financial markets
• Support industrial policy
• Pursue capital account liberalization in an 
incremental and controlled fashion
• Insulate domestic economy from financial 
contagion
• Preserve domestic savings and foreign 
exchange reserves




• Strict regulation on sectoral FDI investment




• No restrictions on repatriation of funds





• Strict limitations on residents and non-residents
• Support industrial policy
• Pursue capital account liberalization in 
incremental and controlled fashion
• Insulate domestic economy from financial 
contagion
• Increase political sovereignty
• Preserve domestic savings and foreign 
exchange reserves
• Help keep exchange rates at competitive levels
Source: Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2003: 304-305).Should Financial Flows Be Regulated? Yes  13
Table 3. Summary: Assessment of the Capital Management Techniques Employed During the 1990s
Country Achievements Supporting factors Costs
Chile
• Altered composition and 
maturity of inflows
• Currency stability
• Reduced vulnerability to 
contagion
• Well-designed policies and 
sound fundamentals
• Neo-liberal economic policy in 
many domains
• Good returns offered to foreign 
investors
• State and administrative 
capacity
• Dynamic capital management
• Limited evidence of higher 
capital costs for Small and 
Medium sized Enterprises
Colombia
• Similar to Chile, but less 
successful in several respects
• Less state and administrative 
capacity than in Chile, meaning 
that blunter policies were 
employed
• Economic reforms in the 
direction of neo-liberalism
• No evidence available
Taiwan
• Competitive exchange rate 
and stable currency
• Insulated from financial crises
• Enhanced economic 
sovereignty
• Debt burdens and financial 
fragility are insignificant
• High levels of state and 
administrative capacity
• Policy independence of the 
central bank
• Dynamic capital management
• Limited evidence of 
concentration of lending to large 
firms, conservatism of banks, 
inadequate auditing of books, 
and risk and project assessment 
capabilities
• Large informal financial sector
• Limited evidence of 
inadequate liquidity in financial 
system
Singapore
• Insulated from disruptive 
speculation
• Protection of soft peg
• Financial stability
• Strong state capacity and 
ability to use moral suasion
• Strong economic fundamentals
• Possibly undermined financial 
sectordevelopment
• Loss of seigniorage
Malaysia 
(1998)
• Facilitated macroeconomic 
reflation
• Helped maintain domestic 
economic sovereignty
• Public support for policies
• Strong state and administrative 
capacity
• Dynamic capital management
• Possibly contributed to 
cronyism and corruption
India
• Facilitated incremental 
liberalization of capital flows
• Insulated from financial 
contagion
• Helped preserve domestic 
saving
• Helped maintain economic 
sovereignty
• Strong state and administrative 
capacity
• Strong public support for 
policies
• Experience with state 
governance of the economy
• Success of broader economic 
policy regime
• Gradual economic 
liberalization
• Possibly hindered 
development of financial sector
• Possibly facilitated corruption
China
• Facilitated industrial policy
• Insulated economy from 
financial contagion
• Helped preserve savings
• Helped manage exchange rate 
and facilitate export-led growth
• Helped maintain expansionary 
macro-policy
• Helped maintain economic 
sovereignty
• Strong state and administrative 
capacity
• Strong economic fundamentals
• Experience with state 
governance of the economy
• Gradual economic 
liberalization
• Dynamic capital management
• Possibly constrained the 
development of the financial 
sector
• Possibly encouraged non-
performing loans
• Possibly facilitated corruption
Source: Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2003: 328-329).14  DESA Working Paper No. 77
public sectors that function well enough to be able to implement coherent policies (administrative capacity), 
and governments that are sufficiently independent of narrow political interests to be able to maintain some 
degree of control over the financial sector (state capacity).
Third, we can see that causation works both ways: from good fundamentals to successful capital 
management techniques, and from successful capital management techniques to good fundamentals. Good 
fundamentals are important to the long-run success of capital management techniques because they reduce 
the stress on these controls and thereby enhance the chance that they will be successful. On the other hand, 
capital management techniques also improve fundamentals. Thus, there is a synergy between capital manage-
ment techniques and fundamentals.
Fourth, the dynamic aspects of capital management techniques are perhaps their most important 
feature. Policy-makers need to retain the ability to implement a variety of management techniques and alter 
them as circumstances warrant.
Fifth, capital management techniques work best when they are coherent and consistent with the 
overall aims of the economic policy regime, or—better yet—when they are an integral part of a national 
economic vision. To be clear, this vision does not have to be one of widespread state control over economic 
activity. Singapore is a good example of an economy that is highly liberalized in some ways, but where capital 
management techniques are an integral part of an overall vision of economic policy and development.
Sixth, there is not one type of capital management technique that works best for all countries; in 
other words, there is no single “best practice” when it comes to capital management techniques.
As I suggested earlier, despite the economic crisis, there is still pressure on developing countries to 
liberalize their capital accounts more than they already have. Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2003) suggest that, 
in many cases, it is not in the interests of developing countries to seek full capital account liberalization. The 
lesson of dynamic capital management is that countries need to have the flexibility to both tighten and loos-
en controls. Thus, if countries completely liberalize their capital accounts, they might find it very difficult 
to re-establish any degree of control when the situation warrants or even demands it. This is because market 
actors might see the attempt to re-establish capital management as abandonment of a liberalized capital ac-
count, and might then react rather radically to this perceived change. By contrast, if investors understand 
that a country is maintaining a system of dynamic capital management, they will expect management to 
tighten and loosen over time. It is therefore less likely that investors will overreact if management techniques 
are tightened in these circumstances.
Statistical Analysis of Capital Controls
Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2005) recently summarized and synthesized more than 30 statistical stud-
ies of the impact of capital controls. Their results are instructive, though subject to further scrutiny. They 
distinguish between controls on inflows and outflows, and find that while capital controls on inflows appear 
to “make monetary policy more independent; alter the composition of flows (to longer term); [and] reduce 
real exchange rate pressures,” they “seem not to reduce the volume of net flows.” As for outflows, the authors 
find that “there is Malaysia and there is everybody else. In Malaysia, controls reduce outflows and may give 
room for more independent monetary policy. There is little evidence of ‘success’ in other countries attempt-
ing to control flows, either in terms of altering the volume or regaining monetary independence” (Magud, 
Reinhart, and Rogoff 2005: 21–22.)Should Financial Flows Be Regulated? Yes  15
Hence, there is a great deal of evidence in support of the ability of inflow controls to help achieve 
important goals; the evidence on the impacts of outflow controls is more mixed. One lesson from this 
is that capital management techniques that control the quantity—and especially the quality—of inflows 
are likely to reduce the necessity of countries engaging in outflow controls for lengthy periods of time if 
problems arise.
Conclusions
As the instability and difficulties associated with uncontrolled international financial flows become more 
apparent in the crisis of 1997, and now 2007 -2009, interest in capital management techniques has been 
revived. Studies reveal that there are many different types of capital management techniques that can be 
custom fit to different countries’ needs and circumstances. Of course, capital management techniques are 
no panacea for economic problems, and they will not work well unless they are part of an overall, appropri-
ate framework of economic management. For countries navigating the treacherous waters of international 
finance, however, they can be useful components of the macroeconomic toolkit.
References
Block, Fred L. 1977. The origins of the international economic disorder: A study of international monetary policy.  
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Cerra, Valerie, and Sweta Chaman Saxena. 2008. Growth dynamics: The myth of economic recovery.  
American Economic Review 98 (1): 439–57.
Chang, Ha-Joon, and Ilene Grabel. 2004. Reclaiming development: An alternative economic policy manual. London: Zed Press.
Crotty, James. 1983. Review: Keynes and capital flight. Journal of Economic Literature 21 (1): 56–65.
Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos F. 1985. Good-bye financial repression, hello financial crash. Journal of Development Economics  
19 (1-2): 1–24.)
Dodd, Randall. 2002. Derivatives, the shape of international capital flows and virtues of prudential regulation. UNU WIDER 
Discussion Paper 2002/93. http://www.financialpolicy.org/dscwider2002.pdf.
Eichengreen, Barry J. 1992. Golden fetters: The gold standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939. New York:  
Oxford University Press.
Epstein, Gerald and Ilene Grabel. 2007. Financial Policy Training Module. International Poverty Centre. UNDP. Brasilia,  
available at http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCTrainingModule3.pdf
Epstein, Gerald, Ilene Grabel and Jomo, K.S. 2003. “Capital Management Techniques in Developing Countries”, in Ariel Buira, ed. 
Challenges to the World Bank and IMF; Developing Country Perspectives. London: Anthem Press.
Garber, Peter M. 1998. Derivatives in international capital flows. NBER Working Paper W6623.
Glyn, Andrew. 1986. Capital flight and exchange controls. New Left Review I/155 (January–February): 37–49.
Grabel, Ilene. 2003. Averting crisis: Assessing measures to manage financial integration in developing countries.  
Cambridge Journal of Economics 27 (3): 317–336.
Grabel, Ilene. 2004. Trip wires and speed bumps: Managing financial risks and reducing the potential for financial crises in 
developing economies. G-24 Discussion Paper 33. http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2420049_en.pdf.
Helleiner, Eric. 1984. States and the reemergence of global finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s. Ithaca, NY:  
Cornell University Press.
Kaplan, Ethan, and Dani Rodrik (2002). Did the Malaysian capital controls work? In Sebastian Edwards and Jeffrey A. Frankel [eds]. 
Preventing currency crises in emerging markets,. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 393–441.
Kindleberger, Charles, P. 1986. The world in depression, 1929–1939. Rev. and enlarged edition. Berkeley:  
University of California Press.16  DESA Working Paper No. 77
Kose, M. Ayhan, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, and Shang-Jin Wei. 2006. Financial globalization: A reappraisal.  
Harvard University, revised December 2006.
Lee, Kang-Kook, and Arjun Jayadev. 2005. Capital account liberalization, growth and the labor share of income: Reviewing and 
extending the cross-country evidence. In Gerald A. Epstein [ed.]. Capital flight and capital controls in developing countries. 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar: 15 -57.
Magud, Nicolas E., Carmen Reinhart, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2005. Capital controls: Myth and reality; A portfolio balance approach 
to capital controls. http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/LACEA-LAMES/2006/168/Magud-Reinhart-Rogoff%20 
(May-09-06).pdf
Neely, Christopher J. 1999. An introduction to capital controls. Review (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) 81 (6): 13–30.
Nembhard, Jessica. 1996. Capital control, financial policy and industrial policy in South Korea and Brazil. New York: Praeger Press.
Ocampo, Jose Antonio. 2003. “Capital Account and Counter-Cyclical Prudential Regulations in Developing Countries,” in Ricardo 
Ffrench-Davis and Stephany Griffith-Jones (eds.), From Capital Surges to Drought: Seeking Stability for Emerging Markets, 
London: Palgrave/Macmillan and WIDER.
Pollin, Robert. 2005. Applying a securities transactions tax to the US: Design issues, market impact and revenue estimates. In Gerald 
A. Epstein [ed.]. Financialization and the world economy. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar: 409-425.
Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2008. Banking crises: An equal opportunity menace. NBER Paper, No. 14587.  
www.nber.org December.
Rodrik, Dani. 1998. Who needs capital account convertibility? Essays in International Finance (Princeton University) 207: 55–65.
Rodrik, Dani, and Arvind Subramaniam. 2008. Why did financial globalization disappoint? Mimeo, Harvard University.  
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/Why_Did_FG_Disappoint_March_24_2008.pdf.
Tobin, James. 1978. A proposal for monetary reform. Eastern Economic Journal 4 (3–4): 153–159.